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Abstract
The contemporary theorization of art can be traced in a series of interlocking and antagonistic positions: the dissolution of art into social relations, the tracking of art as the work of objects that recede from our grasp, and the practice of art as instantiating or linking to an immanent plane. I take the question of immanence as central to these debates. This is because immanence implies a superior plane that exceeds specification or determination, and it also traces the problem of capitalism as our horizon of immanence that threatens to absorb any such excess, whether that is artistic, political or ontological. Tracking the problem of immanence I explore how it rests on the tension of a relation to immanence. Using the work of Gilles Deleuze I analyse this relation as existing in the tension between a moment of excess, often theological, and an immanent relation or fold. Returning to Deleuze’s use of the early Sartre we find that Sartre offers a subtly different thinking of relations and immanence through exploring how we are cast out amongst relations and objects. I then use two of Sartre’s later essays on art to examine his development of a “situated absolute”: the artwork as the site which condenses and gathers the contradictions of relations and objects into itself, precisely refusing immanence. This, I argue, offers the key to unsettling the coordinates of contemporary art theory by re-instating a thinking of the absolute as positional and at once immersed and antagonistic.
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T
he struggle over the contemporary theorization of art is structured by a series of interlocking and antagonistic positions. These can be summarized under: relations, objects, and immanence. The proponents of relations argue that they offer a linking, an interaction, that promises the displacement of the art object and the entry or dissolution of art in social relations.​[1]​ This turn to “relational art” problematically risked dissolving antagonism and encouraging mere immersion into contemporary forms of neoliberal capital.​[2]​ Objects, in the formulations of Object-Oriented Philosophy, offer withdrawal from this relational field and access to the world of the non-human.​[3]​ This access seemed to exceed the world of capitalism, but at the cost of an aestheticization of this access that generated a deliberately anti-political aesthetics, which evades the very question of capitalist forms of value.​[4]​ Immanence implies a superior plane, in the Deleuzian characterization, which can be reached through practices like art. Immanence immerses in order to exceed specification or determination. Relations and objects both reply that this immersion allows no differentiation, simply dropping us into flux and flow – another night in which all cows are black. Sartre castigated thinkers of immanence “in which everything works by compromises, by protoplasmic exchanges, by a tepid cellular chemistry,”​[5]​ although he has in mind very different thinkers to Deleuze. Despite the difference of target, the Sartrean charge is echoed, unconsciously, in critiques of Deleuzian immanence today.​[6]​
This seeming impasse offers the opportunity to reconsider the problem of immanence and not simply in terms of the theorization of art, although this will be my focus here. Art throws into sharp relief the problems of an adequate conceptualization of immanence in the present moment. Immanence is a key term because it does not simply abolish relations and objects in some undifferentiated process, but it raises the question of the relation or link to immanence through relations and objects. This question of the link also raises the crucial political question, which structures these positions, concerning our relation to capital. If the form of immanence we most insistently encounter is the immanence of capitalism, as the “untranscendable horizon” of our time, then we are forced to consider how the metrics of value formation, the “geometry of rationalization,” dictates our experience of immanence today.​[7]​
In question is the desire to break with this form of immanence and so to constitute some sort of alternative or horizon not subject to<Query: should this read “not subject to”? – yes, subject> this metrics. The difficulty is that such a desire often constitutes itself in terms of a militant excess, whether coded as relation, object, or immanence, rather than, to use Jaleh Mansoor’s phrase, a “militant fold.”​[8]​ In the case of militant excess the desire to escape is formed by or through some moment which exceeds all determination. Such a moment flares-up into existence, only then to fall back into the determinations of capitalism and the state. Contrary to such a consolatory but ephemeral moment the necessity is to think a militant fold, which would consider antagonism or contradiction secreted within the seemingly smooth and soft immanence of capital. Art, in this reading, becomes a site to consider the tendency to postulate a militant excess as solution to the riddle of the present moment and the possibility of thinking immanence in a different way, as site of contradiction.
The reason for this is that the tendency to turn to militant excess re-introduces transcendence into immanence. As we shall see, the desire to constitute an absolute immanence is, finally, indistinguishable from the desire for transcendence. The result is a problematic religious or theological register of militant excess. To counter this we can return to Deleuze’s conceptualization of immanence as a problem of relation. The link to immanence is a moment which tends to become sublated in a theological register. To dispute this theological construal I turn to Deleuze’s use of the early Sartre to dispute and put under pressure the concept of immanence. Here I want to add another term to the struggle over the theorization of art: the “absolute.” While objects, relations, and immanence, form the hegemonic “master signifiers” (or, perhaps, little master signifiers, or even buzzwords) of our moment we don’t have much of a taste for the absolute – associated, as it is, with the sins of totalization and (bad) Hegelianism. Sartre’s thinking of art as “absolute,” however, actually offers a means to undo the theological turn to militant excess and disrupts the interlocking positions that constitute our present moment.
To turn to the figure of the “militant fold” is to remain within a Deleuzian topology. My claim is that the occluded debate between Deleuze and Sartre might also put pressure on Deleuze’s topology of the fold. This is to reinscribe the notion of immanence in a direction away from the Deleuzian emphasis on the expansive plane of immanence that absorbs all moments and towards the fold as moment of secreted contradiction and tension. Rather than the dissolution of all questions in the plane or “protoplasmic exchanges,” I consider that we could reinscribe or redescribe the problem of immanence in terms of a tension of relations that engages the political, material, and objects. This would not only be relevant to the field of art. In fact, art could even be considered here as something of a detour to the issues of the political, materiality, and objects although, hopefully, without dissolving the specificity of art as a site in which these issue are posed. Art, or perhaps better the theorization of art, would therefore be a necessary detour to probe and rework the notion of immanence.


facing immanence

In one of his discussions of contemporary art, collected in Chronicles of Consensual Times (2005), Jacques Rancière remarks on the tension in modern art between an art of presence and an art of flatness.​[9]​ This bifurcation shapes modern art, which operates between the piling-up of images and their purification, between the purity of images and the commerce of images. Rancière traces the origin of this tension back to the early Manet’s painting The Dead Christ with Angels (1864). In this painting the dead Christ stares at us as viewers:

The dead Christ reopens his eyes, he resurrects in the pure immanence of pictorial presence and writes down in advance monochrome paintings as well as pop imagery, minimalist sculptures as well as fictional museums in the tradition of icon and the religious economy of the resurrection.​[10]​

Manet’s painting stages “pure immanence,” which coincides with the pure presence of Christ, in the flatness of the image. In this way presence and the image absolutely coincide.
The bifurcation of these tendencies, and their reconvergence, will shape, according to Rancière, the possibilities of modern and contemporary art. This art splits between the flatness of the image, radicalizing it in monochromes, and the iconic function of this flatness, in our fascination for cabinets of curiosities. The importance of Manet is that in this work he condenses both tendencies: flatness that is iconic. Rancière continues: “Their dream of immanence may only come about through self-contradiction: that of a discourse which transforms every piece of art into a little host, a morceau detached from the great body of the Word made flesh.”​[11]​ Immanence begins to coincide with its opposite: transcendence. The desire to achieve absolute immanence, Rancière suggests, cannot be extricated from its theological supplement.
It is this moment of transcendence or transubstantiation which interests me about this little scene of the staging of pure immanence in terms of pure presence, or the coincidence of image and presence. The self-contradiction of immanence is that its “flatness” recomposes grace or depth. The result is that immanence can never coincide with itself, and that this coincidence can only form as a relation of possible transcendence within immanence. It’s not hard to suspect that within a point about the fate of contemporary art Rancière is also making a critical point about the work of Gilles Deleuze, as the premier prophet of immanence.
This tension between immanence and transcendence, flatness and the iconic, is also played out in Jorge Luis Borges’s parable “Paradiso XXXI, 108.”​[12]​ This short text is a strange kind of commentary on Dante’s lines: “‘Segnor mio Iesù Cristo, Dio verace, or fu sì fatta la sembianza vostra?’” In Allen Mandelbaum’s translation: “‘O my Lord Jesus Christ, true God, was then / Your image like the image I see now?’”​[13]​<Query: quote marks OK as inserted? If you wish, whatever the convention is for poetry> The second line is line 108. What concerns Borges is a “broken and scattered god,” a dispersion that he figures in the “irrecoverable face” of Christ.​[14]​ In Dante the split is between the image of Christ then and our image of Christ, with this hiatus raising the issues of representation and truth. To know if we truly had the image of Christ would be, according to Borges, “the key to all parables.”​[15]​ The lost moment of presence would unlock all the enigmas of narrative and restore us to singular meaning.
The difficulty is compounded that while we don’t have access to this image, the past moments of access are also deeply paradoxical:

Paul saw it as a light which hurled him to the ground; John saw it as the sun when it blazes in all its force; Teresa of Léon saw it many times, bathed in a tranquil light, and could never determine the colour of its eyes.​[16]​

For Paul or John it is the excess of light which denies access to the image. For Teresa of Léon the image is perfectly accessible, but still she cannot determine the colour of his eyes. We have lost the image of Christ from the beginning.
Borges, or his narrator, suggests, in line with the opening of the parable, that the image of Jesus’ face may be broken or scattered. Our loss of the infinite is its dispersion everywhere, which permits the possible recovery of the infinite, but only as a fragment. We may catch glimpses of the face in the world: “A Jew’s profile in the subway is perhaps that of Christ; the hands giving us our change at a ticket window perhaps repeat those that one day were nailed to the cross by some soldiers.”​[17]​ Loss is recompensed by dispersion, with the iconic now appearing everywhere: “Perhaps some feature of that crucified countenance lurks in every mirror; perhaps the face died, was obliterated, so that God could be all of us.”​[18]​ We may, as the short narrative concludes, see the face of Christ in our dreams and yet the next day we may not recognize it.
Loss prefigures resurrection. The face or image of Christ appears now as a moment of transcendence in the immanence of the everyday. Borges’s parable prefigures Rancière’s parable of modern and contemporary art. In both cases what is lost in the singular is recovered in the plural, and immanence returns as dispersion and recovery of the sacred. Art today is torn between the singular and the dispersed, between objects and relations, we could say. What repairs this tear is the theological moment of immanence becoming transcendence, a relation that coincides with an object in an excess that escapes both.
I’ve taken these two examples to labour an essentially simply point. Immanence does not form itself into pure immanence and in forming immanence we find a dispersion of into<Query: sense? Into, delete of> transcendence. The expelling of relations and objects, or what appears to be an expelling, leads to their return as moments of grace or, more politically, as moments of “militant excess.” In this way a turn through immanence can resist the soft immanence of contemporary capitalism and disrupt the metrics of value formation. The difficulty is that this is only a temporary moment and one which then returns to immanence. Instead of escape we have a grace or transcendence conferred upon the forms of value, in exactly the way Marx traced in the commodity-form. The fate of art, in which these moments of transcendence generate new forms of value generation, is indicative of this tension.


relating to immanence

The question of constructing or producing immanence is not only a matter of thought but also of a practice, and often of art.​[19]​ It is a matter of forming a relation to immanence. This is true of Deleuze’s work on cinema. One of the roles of cinema is to generate or produce an immanence that is lacking. Again, this is an explicitly religious operation (shortly before this quotation Deleuze remarks on the Catholicism of many filmmakers):

The link between man and the world is broken. Henceforth, this link must become an object of belief: it is the impossible which can only be restored within a faith […]<Query: square brackets OK as added to indicate ellipses not present in the original? Ditto throughout (highlighted in blue). Please indicate throughout any ellipses that are present in the original and therefore should not be enclosed by square brackets> yes, this is an inserted ellipsis, same for others The cinema must film, not the world, but belief in this world, our only link.​[20]​

The role of cinema is to regenerate our belief in the world, to establish the link to immanence as a gesture of faith. The link or relation is turned back towards the theological that now coincides with the immanence of the world.
This practice of reaching the plane of immanence is one not given to philosophy, but to experiment and practice. In What is Philosophy? (1991) Deleuze and Guattari argue that the plane of immanence is “pre-philosophical,” and that to grope towards immanence requires

measures that are not very respectable, rational or reasonable. These measures belong to the order of dreams, of pathological processes, esoteric experiences, drunkenness, and excess. We head for the horizon, on the plane of immanence, and we return with bloodshot eyes, yet they are the eyes of the mind.​[21]​

The relation to immanence is not given to philosophy, but must be formed elsewhere. What is crucial to note, however, is that we “return with bloodshot eyes” to thought or philosophy. The militant excess of immanence may be immanence itself, but only on the condition of thought grasping this excess.
Deleuze and Guattari define the plane as “the formless, unlimited absolute, neither surface nor volume but always fractal.”​[22]​ Deleuze, resolute if ambiguous opponent of Hegel, inscribes the plane of immanence as an “unlimited absolute.” This absolute immanence is given by the fact of an immanence we relate to as inexhaustible and expansive, at once compact and without limits. The compression of immanence, in the same manner as we traced with the theological excess of art, generates an expansive and dispersed grace. Art is one way in which we can touch the plane, but the plane itself is a chaos that never stabilizes. This instability means that we cannot somehow rely on the plane of immanence, but that it must always be constructed or reached. That said, however, it forms an unlimited absolute that exceeds any particular determination – which allows immanence to evade reduction to relations, objects, or forms that might simply lie in congruence with capitalist immanence.
In his final text “Immanence: A Life” Deleuze invokes Sartre’s early text The Transcendence of the Ego (1936–37) to buttress his claims to develop an impersonal transcendental field.​[23]​ In Deleuze’s modelling the field or plane of immanence exists in the absence of the subject or consciousness. For immanence to be immanence it must refer to nothing else: “Absolute immanence is in itself: it is not in something, to something; it does not depend on an object or belong to a subject.”​[24]​ The disappearance of consciousness from this field is a result of its speed: “as long as consciousness traverses the transcendental field at an infinite speed everywhere diffused, nothing is able to reveal it.”​[25]​ This peculiar “accelerationism” of thought displaces consciousness and the subject to reveal a relation to immanence that is delinked from both.​[26]​
What, then, guarantees the relation to immanence for Deleuze? This relation is formed by the generic “a life.” Deleuze argues that “A life is the immanence of immanence, absolute immanence: it is complete power, complete bliss.”​[27]​ The first example of this non-relational relation is the character Rogue Riderhood in Dickens’s Our Mutual Friend (1864–65). Rescued from death, Rogue lies in a coma between life and death. In this state he elicits a strange sympathy, but when he starts to awaken the onlookers realize that:

The spark of life was deeply interesting while it was in abeyance, but now that it has got established in Mr. Riderhood, there appears to be a general desire that circumstances had admitted of its being developed in anybody else, rather than that gentleman.​[28]​

The “separable”​[29]​ spark of life is not so far from Agamben’s later reflections on “bare life” – a “life exposed to death.”​[30]​ It is this strange moment of separable life that touches immanence in a relation that flickers away as actual life is regained, replaced by animosity to the dastardly Riderhood.
Obviously this “spark of life” is related to death, which is not affirmative enough for Deleuze. His other example is that of the child. “Small children, through all their sufferings and weaknesses, are infused with an immanent life that is pure power and even bliss.”​[31]​ What is striking is that this supposedly more affirmative incarnation of “a life” is still predicated on suffering and weakness, which is then transformed into unlimited potential. The religious language of bliss and beatitude, although Spinozan, again indicates how immanence is intimately linked to the religious, if not to the Christological. Immanence is here a relation to “a life,” which persists and insists beyond the realm of subjectivity and consciousness.
The paradox I have explored is that it is precisely in invoking a relation to immanence that Deleuze still turns to a theological conception of this relation – in which we assume or inhabit the grace of immanence. Such a relation tries to insistently position an excess that cannot be reduced to philosophy, while all the while returning to it for its registration and evaluation. The continual attempt to displace immanence from simply agreement with what is, what we might call a “bad affirmationism,” merely results in a “good affirmationism” that insists on excess that must return but can never fully return.​[32]​ This surplus immanence forms the horizon of the theology of immanence.


under a blinding light

Certainly Sartre’s analysis in The Transcendence of the Ego initially appears to conform to Deleuze’s reference. Sartre, abandoning the transcendental “I” of Husserl, remarks, as a result, that “the transcendental field becomes impersonal; or, if you like, ‘pre-personal,’ without an I.”​[33]​ Yet Deleuze flattens Sartre’s conceptuality in his desire to digest and absorb it within the conceptualization of the plane of immanence. Sartre, as I’ve stated, had little regard for what he regarded<Query: avoid (despite different meanings attached to these words)? How about “had little time for what he regarded”? yes, thanks for this suggestion ‘had little time’> as philosophies of immanence. The abandonment of the “I” is not the dissolution of consciousness into immanence or into the vitalism of “a life.” Instead, Sartre – we should specify the early Sartre – is interested in using phenomenology to place us back within the field of objects and relations.
Sartre argues that abandonment of the transcendental “I” means that the ego or me (moi) “is outside, in the world.”​[34]​ In an earlier article, introducing Husserl’s thinking, Sartre had argued that “The philosophy of transcendence throws us out onto the high road, amid threats and under a blinding light.”​[35]​ The category of intentionality, which Sartre took as crucial, throws us out into the world. We burst out towards things. We do not, however, ingest things in what he mocks as “digestive philosophy.”​[36]​ Instead, we place ourselves among things and relations – which have their own affects not dependent on us. “Husserl has put horror and charm back into things.”​[37]​ The result is a philosophy that places us in the actual world: “It is not in some lonely refuge that we shall discover ourselves, but on the road, in the town, in the crowd, as a thing among things and a human being among human beings.”​[38]​ It is this worldly philosophy that would be crucial for the entirety of Sartrean philosophy, although modulated and inflected in different ways across his career.
In The Transcendence of the Ego Sartre picks up and extends the centrality of intentionality as the means by which “consciousness transcends itself.”​[39]​ Consciousness is always consciousness of something:

I am then plunged into the world of objects; it is they which constitute the unity of my consciousness; it is they which present themselves with values, with attractive and repellent qualities – but me, I have disappeared; I have annihilated myself.​[40]​

The “I” is annihilated, but only into a series of relations to objects and not altogether into immanence itself. Intentionality is a transcendence from the stream of immanence that throws us into relations and objects as a field of frictions and tensions. This offers a different emphasis from Deleuze or, at least, from certain moments in Deleuze.
What is true, and this is where Sartre does converge again with Deleuze, is that Sartre conceives of the ego or me as a blockage to the field of consciousness. In a remark that is eerily similar to Lacan, Sartre states:

Everything happens, therefore, as if consciousness constituted the ego as a false representation of itself, as if consciousness hypnotized itself before this ego which it has constituted, absorbing itself in the ego as if to make the ego its guardian and its law.​[41]​

Sartre argues for the primacy of transcendental consciousness as “an impersonal spontaneity.”​[42]​ This would seem to converge with Deleuze’s vitalism, in terms of a primary form of excess or freedom that is uncoded – precisely another version of “militant excess.” Unlike Deleuze, however, for Sartre this spontaneity, this vertigo, does not throw us back into or onto an impersonal plane, but engages us with the world. These “pure spontaneities”​[43]​ ensure we are not simply objects but also that this “absolute consciousness,” while having nothing of the subject, conditions our existence. In fact it places us in contact with the world in a “relation of interdependence.”​[44]​ It places us in situations, to use the title of Sartre’s collected essays.
Plunged back into the world we enter into politics as friction with the world. Idealists posit the “spiritual assimilation”​[45]​ and consumption of the world that “never meets external resistances” and so “suffering, hunger, and war are diluted in a slow process of the unification of ideas.”​[46]​ Against this unification Sartre argues that transcendence places us within the tension of political (and other) forms of relation. Any assimilative philosophy, whether couched as idealist or materialist, simply absorbs the world under its own aegis, whereas transcendence does not allow us to escape, but places us within. This is a thinking of immanence against an immanence that would dissolve relations and objects into one plane. The return to Sartre allows us to problematize the “digestive philosophy” of Deleuze. While Deleuze was once proclaimed the “new Sartre,”​[47]​ and heavily influenced by him, something Deleuze never denied,​[48]​ I want to push Sartre against Deleuze. Sartre dissolves the ego into relations and objects, although not merely into that displaced world of immanence that is the non-human.
Tensions do remain. I’ve already noted Sartre’s tendency to posit an originary freedom or spontaneity which is then compromised through insertion into situations. In this schema, as has recently been noted by Howard Caygill, a stress on decision and meaning tends to displace an account of the tensions and complexities of resistance and force.​[49]​ While Sartre can be used to push against Deleuze, this also involves a pushing against Sartre. Rather than a Sartrean stress on disembedding, which recovers theological excess in the mode of Kierkegaard’s anxiety of decision, I am suggesting that Sartre’s “transcendence” can be read to imply an embedding that works on and in existent forces and potentials. The place of art would be one place of such a working.


art of the absolute

Sartre’s articles “Calder’s Mobiles” (1946),​[50]​ on the work of Alexander Calder, and the second<Query: please check the sense here. If starting the sentence with “Sartre’s articles” is “the second” necessary here? Delete ‘the second’> “The Quest for the Absolute: On Giacometti’s Sculpture” (1948),​[51]​ on Alberto Giacometti, offer us a means to grasp a situated phenomenology. Explicit in the title of the second article, both concern the absolute. This might be something of a surprise, considering a philosophy concerned with objects and relations. Sartre is concerned, as we will see, not with dissolving the art work<Query: this is one word elsewhere. Please advise> one word or object into a field, but on how it stays integral and absolute. This search for the absolute, in both cases, turns on movement. Taking the “static” field of sculpture, Sartre explores how such absolutes “capture true, living moments and craft […] them into something.”​[52]​ Movement is the possibility of inscribing something living into an object, pushing it into relations. The absolute is not correlated with the static and complete, but with this mobility.
Calder’s mobiles are obviously related to movement, taking the forces of nature to imbue themselves with sudden and unpredictable life. Sartre writes:

A Mobile: a little local party; an object defined by its movement and non-existent without it; a flower that fades as soon as it comes to a standstill; a pure play of movement in the same way as there are pure plays of light.​[53]​

This transitory nature of the mobile, which fades and surges up, marks it out from the permanence associated with the artwork: “Sculpture suggests movement, painting suggest depth or light. Calder suggests nothing.”​[54]​ Sartre continues: “His mobiles signify nothing, refer to nothing other than themselves. They<Query: OK as added?> yes simply are: they are absolutes.”​[55]​ This self-referential nature includes relation. They exist for themselves, but as absolute within a field of relations that they engage with.
The mobile exists “halfway between matter and life.”​[56]​ The same might also be said of Giacometti’s sculptures. For Sartre, Giacometti confronts the problem that “for three thousand years sculptors have been carving only corpses.”​[57]​ Again, the problem is to infuse movement and existence into inert matter through a mediation of the human and the stone. Sartre wonders: “I am not sure whether to see him as a man intent on imposing a human seal on space or as a rock dreaming of the human.”​[58]​ Giacometti abandons and reinvents the whole of sculpture from the beginning because he refuses the facile solutions of existing forms. He constantly probes the fact that “there is a fixed boundary to be reached, a unique problem to be solved: how to make a man out of stone without petrifying him.”​[59]​ Again, like Calder’s mobiles, we turn on movement and the problem of space. Giacometti “knows space is a cancer of being that gnaws at everything.”​[60]​ The implication is that mobility gives us access to time and to a time that moves into the future. This dimension of the temporal, particular<Query: OK, or should this read “particularly”? particularly> in terms of mobility to move into the future, is crucial to Sartre in inscribing a force of freedom or rupture.
Movement is restored to sculpture through creating such sculptures as though the human were visible from a distance and in motion. These walking creatures elicit a reaction in us of movement through space, which is visible in Henri Cartier-Bresson’s photograph of 1961, which mischievously doubles Giacometti striding forward with the similar pose of one of his sculptures. The blurred yet frozen image of Giacometti in movement captured by the photograph demonstrates, if anything, the greater mobility implicit in the sculpture. The two, the human and the sculpture, seem about to meet in a collision as the one actually moves and the other implies a virtual movement.
For Sartre, the solution of Giacometti to the problem of movement is to sculpt humans as if seen from a distance. Rather than the illusion of sculpture, which supposes we can view a sculpture from any distance and it remain consistent, Giacometti puts us at a distance. The fragile and elongated figures make us see them from a distance, from a particular viewpoint. The result is a refusal of the claim to neutral “wholeness” or integrity. It is, Sartre writes, “By accepting relativity from the outset, he has found the absolute.”​[61]​<Query: the presence of the wording “it is … ‘By accepting …’” suggests the need for “[that]” to appear in the quote after “outset,”. Alternatively, the sentence as a whole could start simply “Sartre writes:” Please advise> start with ‘Sartre writes’ Instead of the absolute extracting itself from the relativity of relations, it is only by accepting this relativity that we can form the absolute. The absolute is not some neutral plane that escapes relation, but is formed in the relation of human viewer to the object. The object gains its “life” in the forcing of us into a relation to it. In this way the absolute is composed out of this particular relation with an object.
The absolute, the indivisible, is a relational effect. Sartre’s suggestion is radically divergent from Deleuze’s. Sartre claims that Giacometti “has quite simply suppressed multiplicity.”​[62]​ Deleuze, on the other hand, is always concerned with revealing multiplicity, even in the most unlikely of places.​[63]​ The multiplicity of any particular “object” opens up that depth and fractal dispersion that touches upon the plane of immanence. In this way the object loses its integrity and is immersed into multiplicity, which also erodes the security of relations as well. The absolute is unlimited because this multiplicity means it can never be closed. On the contrary, Sartre argues that the absolute is found in the suppression of multiplicity and divisibility. We are forced into a relation, a particular relation, with a particular object. Instead of the dissolution of tension into “protoplasmic exchanges” the absolute forms a sharpening of tension and even conflict, such as we can intuit in the imagined virtual collision between Giacometti and his sculpture implied by Bresson’s photograph.
In summary, the absolute, in the case of Giacometti, coincides neither with immanence nor simply with the integrity of the ever-receding object. As Sartre puts it: “Before him, artists thought they were sculpting being, and that absolute dissolved into an infinity of appearances. He chose to sculpt situated appearance and it turned out that one reached the absolute that way.”​[64]​ This is what I think might be crucial about Sartre’s intervention, largely forgotten as it is; against the Deleuzian “unlimited absolute,” the possibility of a “situated absolute” offers an alternative that places us amongst the stresses of relations and objects. Sartre’s absolute, relative as it is, still has an echo of modernism that is not to contemporary taste. Also, Sartre’s early philosophy or his art criticism is not unproblematic. The tendency to claim a primary spontaneity, the development of a transcendental field, converges with the thematics of militant excess I have been contesting. That said, this suggestion of a particular form of transcendence and a particular form of situated absolute unsettles the interlocking struggles into which the contemporary theorization of art have<Query: “has”? yes ‘has’> settled, and pushes art towards the problem of the militant fold. We placed back “on the road, in the town, in the crowd, as a thing among things and a human being among human beings.”


the situated absolute

Sartre’s situated absolute can undo the forms of militant excess that continue to bewitch contemporary thinking, without simply conceding to the defeat of uncontested immersion. Militant excess posits the theological excess that always escapes. From relations exceeding the limits of “cold” capitalist relations of value through the “warmth” of intimacy, to objects as instances of metaphysically excessive and irreducible moments, on to immanence as a superior plane, we are promised theological excess that consoles us against the penetration of capitalist abstraction. That these moments of excess remain, constitutively, in tension with falling back into those abstractions produces the contradictory tension of our moment between absorption and excess. This is the dialectic of recuperation, which posits an initial purity that is always threatened with recuperation by capitalist logic. While I am not saying recuperation never happens, such a modelling of purity and sin occludes the presence of capital from the start, as horizon, and consoles the creator or excavator of excess with a grace that can then be rued as it falls away. In this context the role of the theorist is to track, construct, or produce the excess that is merely latent, which also gives them an unwarranted power over the naïve. Art is saved and returned to the dignity of philosophical ontology, at the cost of grasping the fact that art is embedded in these contradictions from the start (and this is its virtue).
To signify this embedding by the term “fold” could be regarded as ironic, considering its Deleuzian provenance. Wouldn’t Deleuze’s own account of the fold imply that his analysis of immanence doesn’t form a “militant excess” that is surreptitiously theological, but a folded or re-folded immanence? To briefly return to The Fold (1988) demonstrates, I think, the tension between the Deleuzian conception and what I am trying to reinscribe under this term. Deleuze argues that we have “the fold to infinity,”​[65]​ which opens out a conception of the fold as fractal: embedded, yet infinite. This is, I’d suggest, another inscription of the “unlimited absolute.” Also, unlike Sartre, the fold inscribes a horizontal “flow” that links together artworks in a common field of immanence.​[66]​ What we could call the relative absolute of the particular artwork links to an unlimited absolute through the connective tissues of folding to form a new “diagonal.”​[67]​ In this way the resistant force of the fold inscribes another militant excess at the heart of the militant fold.
It is this conception I am disputing through a strategic turn to Sartre. Rather than the resolution of contradiction in the inscribed infinite the militant fold forms in the tensions and resistances of being thrown out into the world as the world of contradiction. The privilege of art, we could say, lies in its condensing of these moments of contradiction, its inscription within the forms of capitalist value and the immanent horizon of capital. The fold, then, gains militancy, in a certain traction of these forms of real abstraction that cannot be reduced or exceeded by the invocation of a militant excess. Art is, if we like, a kind of probe. The situated absolute, of course, places works in relations, immersing them in the field of objects and relations and so, as Sartre noted, in the political field as well. Political efficacy is not bought through an excess that transcends immanence, but by an action and effect within the immanence of relations. “Transcendence” here throws us out into these relations and contradictions, rather than rescuing us from them. In this way we meet “external resistances,” which are now internal to the work of art and our experience of it. This permits an experience of resistances and stresses within these relations, which are folded into them, rather than at some transcendent point of redemption.
To return to Manet’s Dead Christ I want to conclude with another reflection on the tension encoded in this painting. Jean Clay argues that:

Thanks to the lighting, to the viewing angle, to the daring frontal pose, and to the closing off of the represented space, the dead Christ, in the version on canvas, seems on the point of sliding toward us. His archaizing monumentality, however, holds him back. In any case, it is the “staging” that arouses our conflicting feelings.​[68]​

What interests me is this sliding off – movement that renders the absolute in relation and which is, at the same time, held back. I want to suggest, perhaps in a self-serving fashion, that this sliding shifts us from the attractions of immanence and militant excess into the more slippery and unstable place of the situated absolute and the militant fold.
Militant excess, in this little parable, would be a form of “archaizing monumentality” despite this excess presenting itself as a force of rupture and movement. It would be monumental in withdrawing from relations and objects to pose a friction-free moment or form of immanence that is at once singular and can encompass everything. In contrast, I am identifying the militant fold with the moment of sliding, in line with Sartre’s thinking of the “relative absolute” as movement. The tension between these two moments or forces remains, and I think this speaks to the necessity of thinking in terms of the “relative absolute,” which can retain this tension rather than dissolving it. The tension, or perhaps better contradiction, would then be a starting point for considering the forms and tensions of value, and the resistance to them, in our present moment.
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